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Editor-in-Chief

Letter from the Editor

Dear Readers,

Rhodes College
Sigma Iota Rho Honor Society **Modus Vivendi**
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appeared in fewer articles early on and thus needed to gain attention. However, the greatest factor explaining these levels of radicalization is how the movements framed their issues. The YMP protest adopted an inclusive “anti-nuclear” narrative that echoed previous mainstream movements, appealing to a shared national interest. On the other hand, the DAPL protest juxtaposed indigenous rights with economic and energy security, dividing potential allies by opposing mainstream interests. Such an approach forced activists to become increasingly confrontational to gain support for a controversial issue. By investigating each of these factors in turn, this paper illustrates why the YMP and DAPL protests developed different levels of radicalization. Due to the transformative nature of social movements, the Standing Rock Sioux protest is only considered before the date of 11 October 2016.

Institutions

The varied radicalization between these two movements can first be understood as the result of tribal access to and trust in institutions. For social movement theorists, institutions articulate concerns into policy and “structure the opportunities for collective action” (Doug McAdam, McCarthy and Zald, 1996, 2). Social movements occur when citizens feel that the institutions cannot or will not adequately interpret their concerns, generally because “the traditional policy-making processes focus on dominant interest groups” (Krauss, 1993, 108). Among Native Americans, movements operate within the historical context of tribal sovereignty being “egregiously and unilaterally limited by the US federal government” (Endres, 2009, 44). Both the YMP and DAPL movements mistrusted the U.S. federal government, but they dealt with that institutional mistrust differently. The Western Shoshone overcame the trust barrier by establishing the Western Shoshone Defense Project (WDSP) and working alongside other formal domestic institutions to combat the YMP. The Standing Rock Sioux, leading the DAPL

movement, instead focused on grassroots protests outside of official networks. Since the Western

This shared sense of victimization across the state not only prompted the tribe and the State of Nevada to trust each other, but also guaranteed access to the state legislature for the tribe to express concerns about the NWPA. Combined with the WSDP, this alliance presented traditional political opportunities for the Western Shoshone to contest the YMP without turning to combative strategies.

While the Standing Rock Sioux had similar opportunities in official channels, mistrust and failed attempts at negotiations prompted the movement towards more radical opposition. The root problem was the violation of Executive Order 13175. The order states that federal agencies

institution like the Western Shoshone, the Standing Rock Sioux turned to independent methods. For example, it sent a petition of 160,000 signatures from North Dakota to Washington, DC via Oceti Sakowin runners (Archambault, 2016). By resorting to interest articulation outside of traditional policy channels, the Standing Rock Sioux were left with fewer ways to voice their concerns. Combined with the lack of a state ally like Nevada for the Western Shoshone, the tribe needed confrontational tactics to “let [the federal government] know that [it] will be heard” (Archambault, 2016).

The use of institutions among the Western Shoshone and the move towards grassroots channels by the Standing Rock Sioux illustrates why DAPL became more radical—it lacked the substantial traditional political opportunities that promote conciliatory behavior. Even the opportunities it did have, it did not trust. However, focusing on the U.S. federal government and other institutions addresses more the initial concern that “Indian tribes must be consulted on a government-to-government basis” than the overall development of the protests (Endres, 2009, 50). Institutions also fail to fully account for the role of societal, non-governmental alliances and public opinion on social movement evolution. That being the case, analyzing the radicalization of the YMP and DAPL protests from an institutional standpoint only partially clarifies their differences.

The Media

The second factor explaining the radicalization of these two movements is the role of the media. The news media, while central to social movements, “are not neutral [,] ... lend[ing] themselves to different rhetorics and images [,] ... rendering the salience and intensity of issues [,] ... and focus[ing] attention” (Zald, 1996, 270). Media bias determines the number of stories in which a movement is depicted and impacts its evolution, because less media recognition

DAPL movement to become increasingly radical to gain domestic awareness. Seeing as the YMP protesters received some form of mainstream recognition early on and DAPL saw none, the issue-attention cycle holds that DAPL radicalized more than YMP for recognition.

A subset of the media attention issue concerns official documents. Corporate news media in the U.S. gathers information from “official proceedings, government or agency press releases, and public officials” (Baylor, 1996, 243). One study proved that out of 2,850 articles in *The New York Times* and *The Washington Post*, 78% of information came from such routine channels (Baylor, 1996, 243). That being the case, the higher the number of documents and proceedings associated with a movement, the more likely it is to receive media attention. Implicitly, higher numbers of official proceedings also indicate a lower rate of radicalization. The YMP protest, stemming from the Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA), was more likely to be covered because it started within the routine channels of media information gathering. Following the 1987 amendment of the NWPA, there were at least 15 official proceedings or public statements mentioning the dispute (Nuclear Information and Resource Service, 2016). Such relatively high numbers of official proceedings ensured a consistent presence of news stories for corporate media. The nature of the controversy then provided media saliency without the Western Shoshone becoming confrontational.

DAPL, for its part, saw fewer official proceedings. In July 2016, the Standing Rock Sioux filed a complaint against the Army Corps of Engineers on the federal level (Miller, 2016). Within four months, a petition for an injunction and for an appeal also occurred (Thorbecke, 2016). While there were five official proceedings or statements total, they all concerned that first complaint, *Standing Rock Sioux v. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers* (Thorbecke, 2016). With one legal dispute, the media was not likely to cover the Standing Rock Sioux protest because it was

not prominent in the routine channels of information gathering. The media silence also results from the fact that the DAPL protest occurred in an isolated area where “it was often simply unfeasible to maintain a reporter” (Baylor, 1996 250). The Western Shoshone were similarly isolated, but dealt with so many proceedings in D.C. that its actual location did not impede coverage in the same way (Nuclear Information and Resource Service, 2016). Without numerous statements surrounding the movement, nor a location conducive to media access, DAPL received so little attention that only 5% of all articles concerning the pipeline before October 11 were from domestic mainstream media.¹ In such a situation, DAPL was forced to radicalize to garner corporate media interest.


Given the manner in which the media collates sources, the limited number of proceedings surrounding DAPL early in its issue attention cycle explains why it radicalized more than the

collective action. During the 1970's, the predominately white suburb of Love Canal discovered that their neighborhood was adjacent to a toxic dump site "that endangered their health and their lives" (Krauss, ,1993, 111). Due to the novelty of a white community vocalizing opposition to disproportionate environmental harm, Love Canal put EJ on the mainstream agenda through a "spotlight of publicity on toxic waste" (Rootes and Leonard, 2009, 839). Wider aspects of society, realizing the unbiased health risks associated with nuclear contamination in Love Canal,

surveying stages of YMP, increased cancer rates in Mormon families across the border in Utah were discovered from previ

sacrifice zone could be in the interest of the U.S. if it created such consequences? (Houston, 2013, 421). Prioritizing a nuclear repository above the well-being of citizens, the very people the government is supposed to protect based on the concept of human security, defied the Shoshone's interpretation of national interest. As such, the tribe redefined national interest as the protection of the health and well-being of American citizens. That made way for widespread support and allowed for reformist tendencies, because national interest was then a characteristic of the movement itself.

For their part, the Standing Rock Sioux framed their protest in mutually exclusive terms—indigenous rights or mainstream interests. Since the Standing Rock Sioux constitute a sovereign entity, “they have their own national interest which is often at odds with the national interest of the US” (Endres, 2009, 50). YMP avoided this distinction by creating an overarching national interest framework. However, the Standing Rock Sioux's distinct interest was clean drinking water and the protection of tribal lands, different from that of mainstream society (Archambault, 2016). Seeing as U.S. national interests tend to align with the majority groups, the prioritization of one group over the other puts them in conflict with each other. From the beginning, this dichotomy surrounded DAPL. The pipeline itself moved to the current contested location from Bismarck ““out of concern for the city's safe drinking water”” (Rickert, 2016). If the root of the DAPL protes




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Understanding U.S. Rapprochement with Cuba through the Lens of Punctuated Equilibrium Theory

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On December 17, 2014, President Barack Obama made a historic announcement shattering one of the last vestiges of Cold War foreign policy: after 53 years of severed ties, the United States was rekindling its relationship with Cuba. The President asserted that, while “rooted in the best of intentions,” the outdated policy of the U.S. towards Cuba had succeeded neither to destabilize the Communist Castro regime nor to ensure democracy (Obama, 2014). The rationale for normalization was made clear: the policy of enmity failed to promote the interests of the American people or the Cuban people; thus, the time had come for America to “cut loose the shackles of the past” and “extend the hand of friendship” to “our family to the South” (Obama, 2014). Such lofty objectives and noble justifications, however, failed to address the obvious question: why now? Why only now, after five decades of policy failure, was the time ripe to re-imagine our policy towards Cuba?

Punctuated Equilibrium Theory (PET), in seeking to explain both stasis and change in the policy process, can shed light on both the factors responsible for the persistence of status quo policy as well as the impetus for significant shifts (Baumgartner, et al., 2014). Emphasizing the role of institutional configuration, specifically that of the “policy monopoly,” and the mechanism of a policy image in both perpetuating equilibrium and sparking occasional dramatic change, the Punctuated Equilibrium framework asserts that status quo policy can be broken up only by a change in the policy monopoly, as caused by either a large-scale exogenous shock or the accumulation of minor small-scale events (Baumgartner, et. al., 2014). In applying the framework of Punctuated Equilibrium Theory to the case of U.S. policy towards Cuba, one can hypothesize a response to the difficult question, why now? After 50 years of status quo policy,

The updated American policy towards Cuba maintains the former policy's objective—to promote democracy and a greater concern for human rights—through a strategy of direct engagement and the empowerment of the Cuban people. In a frank admission of U.S. failure to install democracy in other spheres, a WhiteHouse.gov fact sheet on the issue reads: “We know from hard-learned experience that it is better to encourage and support reform than to impose policies that will render a country a failed state” (Office of the Press Secretary, 2014). Thus, the new policy of engagement emphasizes the need for the Cuban people to drive democratic and economic reform from the bottom-up. The components of the new approach are designed to strengthen civil society, foster the growth of the private sector, and widen access to communication by increasing the flow of information and resources to the island (Office of the Press Secretary, 2014).

The new strategy to “help the Cuban people help themselves” marks a radical departure from the enmity of the past in four key regards (Obama, 2014). First, it re-establishes the diplomatic ties between the two states which had been severed in 1961, calls for the re-establishment of a U.S. embassy in Havana and of a Cuban embassy in D.C., and initiates an open dialogue between the two countries regarding issues of shared interest (Office of the Press Secretary, 2014). Second, the policy removes some of the limitations on remittances, donations, and travel, allowing for increased “people-to-people” contact and greater monetary support for humanitarian organizations. Third, it permits the exportation of certain goods, including building materials, communication materials, and agricultural equipment, from the U.S. to bolster private sector growth and improve access to information. Lastly, it calls for Secretary of State John Kerry to review Cuba's designation as a State Sponsor of Terrorism (Office of the Press

defend the status quo. The policy image is “the manner in which a policy is characterized or understood” (Baumgartner, et. al., 2014:85). Policy monopolies promote a favorable policy image that reinforces the policy’s stability through the process of negative feedback.

Baumgartner, Jones and Mortensen provide a succinct description of the causal logic underlying PET:

Complexity in political systems, the accumulation of unaddressed grievances, or other political processes can change the “normal” process of equilibrium and status quo based on negative feedback (which dampens down activities) into those rare periods when positive feedback (which reinforces activities) leads to explosive change for a short while and the establishment of a new policy equilibrium (Baumgartner, et al., 2014, p. 61).

Thus, “explosive change” begins when an issue previously captured in a policy monopoly attracts the attention of new actors (policy entrepreneurs, interest groups, subsystems), either as a result of an exogenous shock or a build-up of minor events. These actors present competing policy images and propose new solutions to the discussion, thus undermining the stability of the policy monopoly. If the policy monopoly is unable to curb the entrance of new actors or the creation of new policy images, positive feedback can occur, in which a small initial change in circumstance can lead to a huge blow to stability. Through effective agenda advancement and proper access, the new policy entrepreneurs can propel the issue into the realm of the macro political system. Because the macro-political system processes information serially, if attention shifts to the particular issue, radical change in policy becomes possible. Thus, policy images, serial shifts, and agenda setting are mechanisms that allow policies in an inherently conservative political system to emerge from the realm of the stability-prone subsystem to the volatile macro-level stage, where policymakers can effect significant policy changes disrupting long periods of equilibrium (Baumgartner, et al., 2014).

Applying PET to U.S.-Cuba Rapprochement

While the CANF left the lobbying arena in 1997, replaced in subsequent years by the U.S.-Cuba Democracy PAC, the Cuba Lobby maintained its policy monopoly for a variety of reasons. First, it was the only lobby group concerned with the issue of the U.S. embargo. William Leogrande, who has written extensively about the influence and activities of the Cuba Lobby, aptly notes that the Cuba Lobby benefitted from the privilege of “policy capture” (Leogrande, 2015, p. 477). With the end of the Cold War, Cuba largely exited the stage of macro-politics, allowing the policy to remain outside the public eye on the subsystem level, where its stability could be ensured by the tight control of the policy monopoly (Leogrande, 2015).

Second, the Cuba Lobby’s maintenance of a favorable policy image regarding the effectiveness of the U.S. embargo and policy of disengagement reinforced the policy’s stability. The U.S.-Cuba Democracy PAC (2014) propagated the image of Cuba as a repressive, terroristic state posing a greater threat to its citizens and the United States with every additional US dollar it received. The PAC’s mission to inform legislators “about the true nature of the Castro regime and their anti-American policies and activities worldwide” conveyed the idea that the existing policy was an effective one. The committee drew largely on Cuba’s designation as a state sponsor of terrorism to assert the Castro regime’s threat to U.S. security. Characterizing Cuba as a state that “maintain[ed] close relations with other state sponsors of terrorism” to such an extent that it was “caught red-handed trafficking weapons to North Korea,” the PAC championed the U.S.’s policy of disengagement and enmity as an essential measure in the preservation of U.S. security interests (U.S.-Cuba Democracy PAC, 2014).

Third, through campaign contributions, the Cuba Lobby exercised strong control in excluding or silencing politicians who posed a threat to the status quo. Leogrande (2013) writes

that the Cuba Lobby “combine[d] the carrot of political money with the stick of political denunciation” to prevent wavering policymakers from challenging the status quo policy, finding several instances in which the Cuba Lobby played a decisive role in State Department appointments, most significantly during the Bush Administration (p. 5). In one case, the lobby denounced Clinton’s choice of Assistant Secretary for Inter-American Affairs on the basis that the candidate had once traveled to Cuba, exerting such pressure on the President that the candidate was removed from consideration (Leogrande, 2013). The U.S.-Democracy PAC’s campaign contributions peaked in the 2008 election cycle, during which the PAC spent over \$750,000 financing federal candidates (Center for Responsive Politics, 2016). In addition to being the highest funded election cycle, 2008 also marked the first cycle in which Democratic candidates received more contributions than Republican candidates (Center for Responsive Politics, 2016). The increase in contributions and the shift in party distribution could reflect a growing concern within the Cuba Lobby regarding the campaign promises of presidential candidate Barack Obama. In a 2008 campaign speech to the CANF, Obama announced his intention to update the U.S. policy toward Cuba and engage in direct diplomacy with Raul Castro (Zeleny, 2008). Shockingly, his message resonated with the audience. Jorge Mas Santos, son of the CANF founder, publicly endorsed Obama’s call for a new approach to Cuban-American relations, stating that the current policy “on its own [is] ineffective and plays into the hands of Raul Castro” (Zeleny, 2008). Such radical departure from the political orientation of the CANF a decade earlier reflects a crucial shift in Cuban American opinion that prompts the emergence of an opposition to the status quo policy and invites new policy actors to the conversation of U.S.-Cuban relations.

Breaking the Policy Monopoly: Emergence of a Competing Policy Image

Santos's endorsement of Barack Obama's promise for change represented a larger trend within the Cuban American community. A 2008 poll surveying Miami's Cuban American community revealed that, for the first time in the poll's seventeen-year history, a majority of Cuban Americans (55%) opposed the continuation of the embargo (Gladwin, 2008). Additionally, 65% of respondents supported the re-establishment of diplomatic ties (compared to 43% in 2004), 67% supported unrestricted travel to Cuba (compared to 46% in 2004), and 38% of respondents reported voting for Barack Obama—an unusually high percentage for a community known to be a bastion of Republican support (Gladwin, 2008). The shift of majority support towards a new approach to Cuban relations proved to be a permanent one. The same poll, conducted in 2014, reported similar findings: 52% of Cuban Americans polled opposed the continuation of the embargo, 68% favored re-establishing diplomatic relations, and 69% supported unrestricted travel (Grenier and Gladwin, 2014). In indicating that the Cuba Lobby no longer represented the majority opinion of the Cuban American community, the 2008 and 2014 polls created an opportunity for meaningful opposition to the status quo policy to emerge. In the past, concern for upsetting the Cuba Lobby, and thus losing the Cuban American vote, rendered the risk of re-

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right to freedom and sovereignty (United Nations, 1960). Yet, geopolitical interests have not disappeared and the acquisition of new territory continues to provide many gifts, economic and otherwise, to developing nations. There are new anthropogenic tactics involving manipulation of the environment for this aspect of nation-building, namely artificial island construction. In China and the United Arab Emirates have used this process as a new geopolitical tactic to secure territory as a part of a nation-building agenda.

routes could help secure China's economic domination and bolster its feelings of national superiority and pride.

Although very different from the United Arab Emirates' nation-building interests, the development and strengthening of a military force is a major part of China's nation-building that evidences itself in the island construction in the South China Sea. These islands have become naval bases with airstrips, surveillance capabilities, and stations for troops. As a whole, island building in the South China Sea has become important for China's nation-building interests because it supplies the capital necessary to continue development and it provides the direct construction of a national identity and a strengthened military presence.

Construction of Luxury Islands in Dubai

Like China, Dubai's artificial island building has the geopolitical benefits of growing the economy and developing national identity. However, these interests evidence themselves in different ways, especially because the area of development for Dubai is not contested and thus lacks major political or legal implications. Dubai's island building has been solely for the real estate and tourism industries. Government investment generated capital that can be deposited back into other nation-building activities, but is also a part of the nation-building tactic of developing a strengthened economic system. The direct economic benefit that can be used for nation-building and the restructuring of the economic system will be examined together for the study of Dubai.

Since the United Arab Emirates was established as a united country in 1971, its leadership rapidly developed its political systems and economic policies. The country has a wealth of natural resources, namely oil, which allowed for the accumulation of capital and rapid

development. Today the country is considered fully developed based on levels of GDP and Human Development Index score (The World Bank, 2016; United Nations Development Programme, 2015) . However, for this study of artificial island building, which dates back to the mid-1990s, the Emirates was still considered a developing nation, though both a successful and a high-income one due to oil revenues. At the time, Dubai aimed for sustained economic development, which led to the restructuring of its economic system. The entire UAE government endeavored to diversify industry to protect against fluctuations in the oil market that began after the shocks in the 1970s (Gause, 2002, p. 63). A study of Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states, “The political emphasis on diversification seems to have fluctuated inversely with the incomes from oil and gas, such that low oil prices spurred strong political emphasis on diversification”, proving governmental focus on restructuring and market diversification as important nation-building efforts (Hvidt, 2013, p.2).

Dubai, in particular, “led the way in economic diversification away from oil, and its ruling family enjoys a good deal of autonomy within the UAE” (Herb, 2009, p. 41). As the Emir of the UAE, the ruling family has been instrumental in the diversification of the economy away from oil. The ruling family has been instrumental in the diversification of the economy away from oil. The ruling family has been instrumental in the diversification of the economy away from oil.

development. Ports boss Sultan Bin Sulayem and concept designer Warren Pickering developed the plans for an island off the coast of the city. The new island, Palm Jumeirah, would give Dubai forty-eight miles of new shoreline (Krane, 2009, p. 153). And with the development of the island, the benefits of a centralized government are evident. In 2000, Sheikh Mohammad launched a new company from the government's department of ports and customs, which came to be known as Nakheel, with bin Sulayem at the head. Nakheel completed Palm Jumeirah in 2006, along with another palm shaped island and an archipelago of three hundred masses representing countries, called The World. Financial limitations, especially after the 2008 recession, curbed a fraction of the emir's ambitions, as some of the originally planned islands were cancelled. Despite these complications, the development still succeeded in achieving capital gains, part of a larger restructuring of the economy. The United Arab Emirates has one of the most diverse economies of the Gulf States based on the percentage of oil that makes up its GDP, with the lowest of the GCC states at 32% in 2011 (Hvidt, 2013, p. 13). The state's incredible construction of manmade geographical area provides capital for the country to invest in other nation-building activities, and this development aided in the improvement of the economic system, an important nation-building interest for Dubai's leadership.

The islands also act as a physical translation of Dubai's identity, another important aspect of nation-building. As stated in the English language Emirati newspaper *The Gulf Today*, "Our leaders have inspired [our] nationals to work hard to develop their motherland into one of the most prosperous and peaceful countries on this planet" (Faria, 2016). This statement reflects the sentiments on national identity and pride in Dubai. The impressive engineering projects in the city, including massive man-made islands, clearly exemplify the prosperity of Dubai. Further, the islands themselves reflect the city's identity, as Sheikh Mohammad requested a design that

would reflect the national symbol of the date palm (Krane, 2009, p. 153). Moreover, willingness to open to the West and the values of the city, or at least the expression thereof, differ from much of the Arab world. Dubai is much more socially liberal than other states in the region. The development of an open and prosperous identity also perpetuates economic growth, as it is these characteristics that attract tourists.

Environmental Effects and Conclusion

Both China and the United Arab Emirates found the geopolitical tactic of land acquisition important for sustaining economic growth and for investing other nation-building interests. Their centralized political economies proved effective in the obtainment of new territory as a means to progress and build their developing states. Unlike the 15th century when undeveloped territory was readily available and the exploitation of such territories was permitted, these states were forced to manipulate the environment, aided by new technologies, to acquire territory. Now, China and Dubai exploit the environment by reclaiming land to meet their nation-building interests.

And as it happens, the process of creating these islands is a costly one for the surrounding ecosystem. The creation of artificial islands requires sediment to be sucked up, transported through a long pipe, and then deposited on the desired area. In the South China Sea, sediment is deposited onto existing reefs, thus effectively destroying them and damaging the surrounding marine ecosystem. China's construction alone resulted in the destruction of 311 hectares of precious reefs (Batongbacal, 2015). In the New York Times, Frank Muller-Karger, professor of biological oceanography at the University of South Florida, contributed that "sediment 'can wash back into the sea, forming plumes that can smother marine life and could be laced with heavy metals, oil and other chemicals from the ships and shore facilities being built'" (Watkins, 2015). Additionally, the occupation of islands in the South China Sea will result in constant pollution

directly into the marine ecosystem from ships and other equipment, as well as day-to-day activities of occupancy. Further, the island will negatively impact food supply for other peoples. China's overfishing already caused major problems for marine ecosystems and other nations that rely on the same fisheries. The Philippines' coastal communities, for instance, are dependent upon fisheries in the South China Sea for subsistence, and thus are sensitive to unchecked Chinese fishers (Batongbacal, 2015). Chinese anthropogenic activities in manipulating the environment to fit the state's interests severely damage the region's ecosystems and results in a multitude of negative impacts.

The same effect occurs off the coast of Dubai, where the island construction and the resulting layers of sediment are "destroying the marine habitat, burying coral reefs, oyster beds and subterranean fields of sea grass, threatening local marine species as well as other species dependent upon them for food." Additionally, these ecosystems that provide food and shelter to marine species also protect the coastline from erosion and storms (Butler, 2005). However, after receiving negative publicity, the development company admitted to adverse environmental effects from the construction and has taken steps towards preventing further degradation of the

government, expressed concern over environmental degradation and committed to adaptive activities. Of course, China following suit is unlikely. As Dubai developed directly against the coast, its effects can easily be seen by citizens that pressure the company and the government about its environmental consequences, whereas the development in the South China Sea is physically hidden from citizens that may have environmental sympathies. Additionally, as discussed, the South China Sea has national security and military implications, and these themes dominate environmental concerns. It is doubtful, even if environmental protection groups were to advocate against the construction, that China would renounce their territorial claims and cease development in the South China Sea.

As these developments clearly come with a price, the question seems to be, both for China and the Emirates: if geopolitical development remains necessary to their respective interests, economic or otherwise, can it be sustainable? Nakheel claims that it is. The company hired experts to begin developing artificial coral reefs to replace those destroyed by island construction. A group of researchers found that of the areas they studied, artificial reefs had higher coral cover, but lower species diversity and richness. They concluded that while artificial reefs can support coral and fish communities, they differ structurally from natural reefs and cannot be considered a replacement (Burt, Bartholomew, Usseglio, Bauman, & Sale, 2009). Artificial reefs could even aid with Dubai's goals, as abundant coral reefs attract tourists. Yet, these reefs cannot replace the hundreds of acres of real reefs lost, and China has made no indication of interest in developing artificial reefs. Clearly, it is unlikely that either country will halt development in the near future as they invested heavily in development, despite the environmental costs.

In brief, both states stand to reap major benefits from artificial island building. China will gain a military stronghold in a contested region and affirmed importance in the international community. Both China and Dubai will have some economic returns from development, if not massive gains, which may allow further investment in nation-building activities. Yet, the construction of islands themselves is already an effective nation-building tactic, without additional returns. The developing states are able to use land reclamation as a tactic to maintain, grow, and assert their economic and political power as well as their national identity. Further, the situations in China and Dubai prove the benefits of a centralized political economy for a developing nation. And both cases demonstrate the lasting importance of territorial acquisition to developing nations and international affairs in a modern global system. With worldwide technological advancements, geopolitics now involves modern methods of development such as artificial island building. These means of progress mark the shift to the new anthropogenic geopolitics required in a world with an ever growing population and an unceasing desire to develop.


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Exploitation and Denial of Citizenship: Applying Marxist Revolution Theory to the Problems of the Kafala System in Kuwait and the United Arab Emirates

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Introduction

Many states within the Middle East have recently experienced revolt, which has stemmed from governmental instability, political illegitimacy, controversial and exclusionary principles of radical parties, and a general sense of dissatisfaction. According to Marxist Revolution Theory,

comply, knowing that they will make more money in the Gulf States than they would be able to make in their native countries (Auwal, 2010). However, it should be noted that the migrant workers are usually not *fully* aware of the conditions that await them, and they are often misled by their interpreters and recruiters to believe that they will be doing more meaningful work in significantly better conditions (Auwal, 2010). Additionally, the cost accumulated in fees for recruiting agencies, travel expenses, and visas often cause migrant workers to arrive already indebted to their employers, which adds more pressure for the worker to make a substantial sum of money (Rahman, 2015).

A particularly harmful feature of the Kafala system is the tethering of workers to their employers. The harmfulness of this feature is highlighted by workplace disputes, because international sponsorship, which is needed for legal residence, is achieved through the worker's employer. Thus, changing between employers is almost impossible. Even if workers are able to go through a formal legal process of changing sponsorship, the process usually takes far too long, and the worker in question will likely lose his or her job due to absence from the workplace (Varia, 2011). Without work, he or she is ultimately subject to deportation as he or she would technically be an unsponsored expatriate and therefore, subject to harsh legal ramifications (Mahdavi, 2013). Such situations evoke feelings of hopelessness in migrant workers, and place power in the hands of employers, which is exactly where the state wants power to be held. Thus, the state can continue oppress migrant workers, and pave the way for a bourgeoisie-dominated society.

The Kafala System of Kuwait

Kuwait first implemented the Kafala system to provide Kuwaiti citizens with meaningful work while using migrant laborers to fill less desirable jobs (Tétreault 70). Written in 1962, The

current migrant workers (Mahdavi, 2013). The UAE's Kafala system is an excellent example of the exploitation of migrant workers in Middle Eastern society.

A large portion of migrant workers are formally excluded from the guarantee of labor rights ensured by the government. Articles 3 and 72 of the Emirati labor law state that domestic workers, farmers, and seafarers are excluded from the provisions of labor laws, this exclusion has now come to be applied to workers within most sectors of less-meaningful work (Mahdavi, 2013). Thus, Kafala employers have the dangerous freedom of treating workers however they please. Furthermore, the UAE's labor law contains a clause stating that migrant workers can be immediately deported if they are suspected of committing 'moral wrongdoing' (Mahdavi, 2013). Such a phrase is intentionally vague to continue marginalization of migrant workers while simultaneously solidifying the power of Kafala employers. This contributes to the already deep societal cleavage between the upper and working classes because of tension and power politics between workers and employers.

The governments of both Kuwait and the UAE intentionally further the societal cleavages between migrant workers and employers of migrants in their countries by concentrating power in the hands of unjust Kafala employers. This, in turn, creates regime stability for both Kuwait and the UAE.

1995). Such a caveat fosters competition and disunity among the migrant workforce, which is in accordance with Marxist theory in the sense that the state is intentionally creating divisions among the proletariat class to distract from efforts at unifying or expressing common grievances.

Kuwait's creation of such an exclusive system of citizenship has led to several implications that have threatened the government's overall goal of maintaining stability through division of the working class. When the government eventually runs out of jobs, Kuwait will be facing a multi-dimensional issue of public disapproval. The population of permanent non-citizen residents and migrant workers have already begun voicing dissatisfaction with the Kuwaiti government due to feelings of a lack of representation, unsafe working conditions, and the impossibility of achieving proper citizenship. Such frustration is already disturbing societal cohesion, as is predicted in Marxist Revolution Theory.

Exclusive Citizenship and Naturalization Laws of the United Arab Emirates

Similar to Kuwait, the UAE employs a very exclusive and difficult naturalization process. The UAE has maintained the highest annual immigration growth rate in the world: 15.9% from 1960 to 2005 (Jamal, 2015). Such a high rate is indicative of beliefs held by migrants that building a new life for themselves and their families in the UAE is possible. In terms of demographics, the UAE has a comparatively smaller population of proper citizens. In 2015, only 11.5% of the UAE's total population of 8.26 million were proper citizens (Jamal, 2015). However, the classification of 'proper citizen' in the UAE is more complicated than in Kuwait, because the UAE possesses a concrete hierarchy of citizenship classifications (Jamal, 2015). Specifically, there are three types of citizens: full citizens, partial citizens, and Bidoons. Full citizens either possess a so-called 'family book,' which shows a heritage of Emiratis tracing back to at least 1925, or they were officially granted citizenship by the state (Jamal, 2015). Partial

citizens are Emirati passport holders who are citizens for legal purposes but have not been officially granted citizenship (Jamal, 2015). Finally, Bidoons are not citizens, but they possess an Emirati identification card and are officially classified as former nomads (Jamal, 2015). Such an explicitly-defined hierarchy of citizenship contributes to a lack of nationalism, which is already threatened by the cohabitation of citizens and non-citizens.

In addition to the lack of cohesion of Emirati citizens, the state ensures that migrant populations remain disjointed by carefully regulating the flow of migration into the UAE. The state will randomly select migrant communities that will receive preferential treatment in visa renewals, access to better jobs, and generally better humanitarian treatment (Jamal, 2015). Thus, the UAE ensures that the working class remains disjointed enough to remain at its current place in the hierarchical social system. As compared to the intentional distinction between meaningful and non-meaningful work in Kuwait, which ensures that the working class remains humble as a result of the upper class's elitist attitude.

The UAE has built its strict naturalization process upon the claim that granting migrants citizenship would be threatening to the Emirati sense of identity (Jamal, 2015). Many political scientists have discounted such a claim, as the UAE has historically been known to allow masses of migrants to become permanent residents within the migrant workforce, so their 'infiltration' of Emirati culture is already present (Jamal, 2015). The strict naturalization process dates back to the British involvement within the UAE, as the British also wanted to control population growth to also suppress potential uprising (Jamal, 2015). Similar to the requirements of Kuwait, those wishing to obtain Emirati citizenship must fulfill a residency requirement (the length of which is determined by the individual's nationality), a language requirement, and an employment requirement (Jamal, 2015). However, further than that, the process is largely undefined, so

foreigners are rarely granted citizenship at all; when they do, no observable pattern emerges (Jamal, 2015).


As is the case in Kuwait, the UAE is already experiencing a disrupted societal cohesion due to strict citizenship and naturalization laws. Additionally, the engineering of a strategic flow of migration of workers into the UAE is indicative that the state recognizes the threatening nature of unity among the working class.

Conclusion

Both Kuwait and the UAE are using the Kafala system and exclusive citizenship and naturalization laws to prevent social uprising and eventual revolution. Mass frustrations are already brewing among the migrant workforces of both Kuwait and the UAE, where workers are realizing that they are being entrapped within the exploitative Kafala system with no path to eventual naturalization. Tensions experienced as a result of both of these institutions are disrupting societal cohesion, and they will soon likely eventually boil to a tipping point.

References

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The Impact of Periods of Political Unrest as an Avenue for Low Fertility Rates in a Country

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Introduction:

Regarding fertility rates of a country, totals that fall below the general replacement rate can be detrimental to economic growth through an aging working class (Belsie, n.d.). Developed countries tend to have low fertility rates resulting from lifestyle choices that advocate economic prosperity, while developing countries lean toward high fertility rates due to a lack of effective contraceptives, limited female education, and a vital child labor force (Nargund, 2009). Data has shown, however, that there are some developing and economically low income nations that have relatively low fertility rates despite their developing status. The question arises of what contributes to a country having low fertility rates if not founded on its developed or developing economic ranks. Many anthropologists propose that countries with low fertility rates are heavily affected by economic changes such as higher education attainment, decreasing employment, or increasing poverty rates in that country's working infrastructure ("Economics influence fertility rates," 2013). This assertion is based on low fertility rates being used as a response to both periods of economic stability and instability in a country. These same anthropologists also propose that low fertility rates can be reversed by implementing monetary incentives to the people in that country ("Economics influence fertility rates," 2013). I, however, advocate that pivotal periods of political unrest in a specific point in a country's history can provide the necessary framework for fertility rates to decrease and remain low. Economic status is only one factor for why certain countries have low fertility rates and not the overall underlying reason. The values that are established in the people during these specific times are what continues to support low fertility rates in the present. This comparative analysis will examine the developed,

Both the German student protests and the Cuban Revolution resulted in a steep decline in fertility rates in each country within a 10-

Cuban Revolution. The Cuban Revolution of the early 1950s was a period of political unrest that included an armed revolt led by Fidel Castro against President Fulgencio Batista's authoritarian regime ("The Cuban Revolution," n.d.). The disdain for the Cuban dictator started when President Batista seized power during the election season of 1952 to maintain control over Cuba. Seeing this as an unfair authority grab, Fidel Castro sought to ostracize President Batista with the help of the 26th of July Movement by his side. Castro increased its arsenal by collecting new weapons and staging guerilla attacks against President Batista ("The Cuban Revolution," n.d.). Although Fidel Castro and his followers eventually overthrew President Batista, Cuba continued to be a non-democratic country under Castro rule as time went on. The Cuban government advocated that the better the 98.56 cmBT/TT8 1 u 0 Tm() TjETQ 8 40 576 734 reWn/Cs1 cs0 0 0 scnq0.24 t

indifferences and economic insecurities. High level countries accept hierarchical order with no rationalization while low level countries strive for equal allocation of power and demand explanation for societal inequalities (Hofstede, 2010). These two dimensions cooperatively support Germany and Cuba's current low fertility rates.

Germany's low power distance score of 35 and high uncertainty avoidance score of 65 resulted from the protests of displeasure of many of the reforms and policies college students felt were "undemocratic" and how they lacked a fair voice in how their colleges were being administered in the 1960s and 1970s (Schaefer, 2008). The West German government, in the eyes of the students, was beginning to become more authoritarian, which was displayed in the increased instances of police brutality and press censorship on college campuses throughout several German cities (Medeiros, 2012). Germany's low power distance score is the embodiment of that quest for equal opportunities for all people. Germany's strong middle class is supported by their high individualism, advocates co-determination rights in management, open communication, limited control, and cooperative leadership (Hofstede, 2010). This mindset has reinforced Germany's decreasing fertility rates for over the past 50 years. Low power distance created a high level of self-esteem and confidence in Germans to achieve their fullest potential and succeed economically and socially. High uncertainty avoidance levels only solidify Germany's pursuit to avoid unnecessary responsibilities in having more than one child and remaining financially stable. Although Germans are currently more capable of dealing with uncertain future events based on the democratic and developed nature of the country, Germans maintain a sense of cognizance that allows them to always try to be one step ahead of any situation and low fertility rates are just one of the ways that they showcase this awareness.

Cuba, oppositely, has high levels in both power distance and uncertainty avoidance which are a direct result of the rough political events during the Cuban Revolution and the unjust implications that resulted from it. Since the period during the Cuban Revolution until the present, Cuba remained unfree and completely under an authoritarian rule. High power distance scores entail that any unfair policies that Cubans feel are detrimental to their way of life cannot be resolved with authoritarian rule under a dictator (“Cuba,” n.d.). Cubans have grown accustomed to living under strong state control over civil society in factors such as power, wealth, and laws (“Cuba,” n.d.). High power distance supports low fertility in that Cubans feel it is too risky for them to have more than one child under such powerful governmental rule. Coupled with a high uncertainty avoidance that is based on the strict enforcement of an unchanging societal structure, Cubans citizens do not have much control over what happens in their lives economic and social lives and are accustomed to many things being planned by others (“Cuban Culture According to Hofstede,” n.d.). There is also a strong sense of governmental distrust in the Cuban culture that resulted from Cubans believing that Fidel Castro was going to make their country democratic during the Cuban Revolution and that promise not being fulfilled. Thus, Cubans take very few risks and low fertility is supported.

With Germany and Cuba’s levels of power distance and uncertainty avoidance, it is showcased that fertility rates can be formed on a cultural belief that reinforces how individuals feel about the societal injustices and the ambiguities of the future. Although Germany and Cuba have differences in Hofstede’s power distance and uncertainty avoidance models, how they perceive themselves in association with the power of the government economic and unknown situations about the society around them is what justifies these two country’s low fertility rates.

Long and Short Term Orientation Dimension:

With long and short term orientation, high levels of conclude a more pragmatic country which encourages modern thinking for situational issues (Hofstede, 2010). Low levels showcase normative societies that value cultural traditions while still viewing society under a suspicious lens (Hofstede, 2010). Germany's long term orientation and Cuba's short term orientation is the overall foundation of the different scores they have in their individualism, power distance, and uncertainty avoidance dimensions. Their low fertility stems from how they correlate their history to current events.

Germany, with a very high score of 83, is considered a long term oriented country because citizens can adapt easily to changed conditions and show a strong sense of persistence and perseverance (Hofstede, 2010). This mindset resulting from the student protest movement strongly supports Germany's low fertility rates in that citizens never gave up until they achieved the progress they wanted to see in their country's society. Germans, with their unending drive for economic stability, use their evolving determined and enduring value set to strive to be the best that they can be both financially and socially. This drive supports their current low fertility rates

Cuba, however, is a short term oriented country that focuses on the present and immediate results. They usually live day to day lives and do not plan much economically for the future. This type of mindset is supported by its low fertility rate in that Cubans leave their futures up to the government and it is against the law to go against it. Cuba, which continues to be under authoritarian even since the Cuban Revolution, is a country that citizens know their place and more children would not be in the best interest under their value set.

Summary, Conclusion, and Importance Relevance:

The initial question drawn at the beginning of this comparative analysis was whether the economic status of developed or developing provided the necessary contribution to why some countries around the world have low fertility under the replacement rate. With this analysis, it is clear economic levels are only one factor in the overall driving force that allow many countries to reach and maintain low fertility status. With the usage of Gerald Hofstede's Model on National Dimensions, we see that low fertility rates can be warranted through values that are solidified during specific periods of political unrest in a country's history. Low fertility rates, as in Germany and Cuba, are the direct embodiment of how individuals voice their concerns about society and how they feel they can remain or achieve economic success. It is more well-known that high fertility rates are economically, demographically, and environmentally unstable, but societies must also advocate how detrimental low fertility rates can be (Consequences of High Fertility," 2010). As with Germany and Cuba, there have been many incentives implemented to try and reverse their low fertility rates. These incentives, however, have not seen any significant changes that allow their rates to rise above replacement. The reasons for why these incentives have not worked in Germany or Cuba are because they are focused solely on monetary benefits and do not reflect these country's specific cultures and values. It is important for countries with

low fertility rates to evaluate pivotal moments of political unrest in their histories to understand the cultural makeup of their citizens in the present to find ways to boost fertility rates. It is extremely difficult to persuade a person to have two or more children based solely on monetary gains. Societies must recognize these cultural characteristics to motivate its people to have more children in a way that will not sacrifice their personal values and aspirations for the future.

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regime is clearly identified in his 1973 “Five Point Address” where he announced that those who organized against him would face immediate death. He backed his threats with action, showcasing public hangings and mutilations of his political opponents (Eljahmi, 2006). Not only was his regime far from democratic, but it infringed upon the most basic of human rights. Ghadafi used fear and intimidation to enforce cooperation in place of rule of law.

On February 17, 2011, an armed conflict fought between the loyal forces of Colonel Gadhafi and those seeking to oust his government marked the beginning of the Libyan Revolution. The war was preceded by protests in Benghazi beginning on Tuesday, February 15, leading to clashes with security forces that fired at civilians in the crowd, and quickly escalating into a rebellion that spread across the entire country. The protests within Libya quickly gained momentum despite Gadhafi’s violent response, and by March, the country was immersed in a full-fledged revolution (Amoretti, 2016). After months of armed conflict, in September of 2011, the National Transitional Council was recognized by the United Nations as the legal representative of Libya, replacing Gadhafi who was later captured and killed that October. October 23, 2011 marked the official end of the war, with the National Transitional Council officially declaring the liberation of Libya.

What brought about this change? What drove the anti-Gadhafi citizens to finally take action after forty years under his rule? What allowed for the movement to transition into revolution and war? Social movement theory allows for the careful analysis of this transition into revolution, assessing why the initial social movement arose and later why it blossomed into a civil war. However, it is essential to first establish the causal logic and assumptions this theory poses. Firstly, one must understand that ideas of change among actors are essentially generated

are related to material goods (i.e. money, capital, wealth, power etc.). They can also be post-materialist, which are prominent after a country has developed economically; a few examples of post-materialist factors include civil rights, morality issues and animal welfare. In the case of Libya, it is evident that post-materialist factors divided the population, in which the anti-Ghadafi forces demanded civil liberties and greater freedoms, and in which the pro-Ghadafi forces suppressed these requests to keep the status quo in their best interest.

maintaining his power and authority, but also refusing to succumb to the public's plea during the protests demonstrates how he remained insulated from public pressure. Because the assumed public pressure from the act of protesting did not seem to faze him, a more radical and violent approach was

odds as in their favor. This is what ultimately leads to social movement and, eventually, revolution in this case.

In regards to limitations, there is a problem in regards to resource mobilization, in that it focuses almost entirely on social movement organizations, and neglects the existence of social movement communities. These communities are exceedingly decentralized and do not fit into the organization framework. As seen in the 2011 movement in Libya, the movement itself was leaderless. There was no particular organization that acted as a driving force for action.

Social movements prove to be complex and inconsistent. However, by applying social movement theory, one can begin to identify the logic behind collective action and even understand the possibility of success. In the case of Libya in 2011, social movement theory successfully explained the emergence of civil war from protests by bringing attention to the country's center periphery cleavage, its resource mobilization in the form of social media

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